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This paper focuses on the impact of benchmarking the energy performance of U.S. commercial buildings 
by requiring utilities to submit energy data to a uniform database accessible to building owners and 
tenants. Understanding how a commercial building uses energy has many benefits; in particular, it helps 
building owners and tenants focus on poor-performing buildings and subsystems, and enables high-
performing buildings to participate in various certification programs that can lead to higher occupancy 
rates, rents, and property values. Through analysis chiefly utilizing the Georgia Tech version of the 
National Energy Modeling System (GT-NEMS), updating input discount rates and the impact of 
benchmarking shows a reduction in energy consumption of 5.6% in 2035 relative to the Reference case 
projection of the Annual Energy Outlook 2011. It is estimated that the benefits of a national benchmarking 
policy would outweigh the costs, both to the private sector and society broadly. However, its geographical 
impact would vary substantially, with the South Atlantic and New England regions benefiting the most. By 
reducing the discount rates used to evaluate energy-efficiency investments, benchmarking would 
increase the purchase of energy-efficient equipment thereby reducing energy bills, CO2 emissions, and 
conventional air pollution. 
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Understanding how a commercial building is using energy has many benefits; in particular, it 
helps building owners and tenants focus on poor-performing buildings and subsystems, and it 
enables high-performing buildings to participate in various certification programs that can lead to 
higher occupancy rates, rents, and property values. However, in many cases, the recipient of 
energy information does not have the incentive or the ability to improve energy performance, 
such as the relationship between tenants and building owners. 
 
Partly because building performance information is largely unavailable, building owners and 
occupants have forgone cost-effective investments in energy efficiency that could significantly 
reduce energy consumption and utility bills. That is, a large gap exists between the most cost-
effective use of energy in commercial buildings and the consumption of energy in practice 
(Granade et al., 2009; Hirst and Brown, 1990).  Assessing the energy consumption of a building 
is the first step in establishing “baseline” energy use and benchmarking efforts. After all, “You 
can’t manage what you don’t measure.”   
 
The commercial building sector suffers from two main information problems. First, there is a 
large principal-agent problem in the sector, which occurs when one party (the agent) makes 
decisions in a given market, and a different party (the principal) bears the consequences of 
those decisions. Such market failures were found by Prindle (2007) to be significant and 
widespread in many end-use markets in both the U.S. and other International Energy Agency 
(IEA) member countries. In many commercial buildings, architects, engineers, and builders 
select equipment, duct systems, windows, and lighting for future building occupants who will be 
responsible for paying the energy bills. Once occupied, landlords maintain appliances and 
equipment for tenants who then pay the energy bill. Second, a decades-long research effort has 
identified discount rates related to equipment purchases that are far higher than anticipated, 
resulting in fewer purchases of high-efficiency equipment (Frederick, Loewenstein, and 
O’Donoghue, 2002; Train, 1985). 
 
This policy option focuses on giving building owners in the country access to baseline 
information on their building’s energy consumption. This could be accomplished by requiring 
utilities to submit energy data in a standard format to a widely used database, such as Portfolio 
Manager, which currently maintains information on hundreds of thousands of buildings in the 
U.S., submitted by building owners and managers. Using existing software packages, 
combining the meter data from utilities with that from the building owner could provide a “virtual 
building meter,” allowing for building-wide analysis.1  The data would then be available to the 
building owner and the utility and maintained by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
                                                          
1
 Certain utilities, like Consolidated Edison and Austin Energy, have developed meter aggregating tools to 




According to a report sponsored by the U.S. Green Building Council, Real Estate Roundtable, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, and others (Carbonell, Fidler, and Douglas, 2010), the 
EPA may have the authority to require utilities to submit building energy data under Section 114 
of the Clean Air Act. This utility data must be connected to individual buildings to be useful in 
providing building owners with baseline energy performance information. A uniform national 
building identification system, similar to the VIN system for cars, could facilitate this connection 
regardless of where a building is located, how it is used, or whether it has multiple street 
addresses – all currently issues in energy benchmarking. 
 
In this paper, we discuss an approach to benchmarking that involves two features: 
 
 Require utilities to submit whole building aggregated energy consumption data for all 
tenants in electronic form to EPA Portfolio Manager 
 Develop a national registry of commercial buildings, with each building receiving a 
unique Building Identification (BID) number, analogous to the VIN number for 
automobiles 
 
If implemented, better building energy data would become available to owners, tenants, and 
utilities. In turn, benchmarking efforts could be accelerated; demand-side management 
programs could become more feasible; municipal governments would have a uniform system for 
building codes and mandated disclosure reporting; and the federal government would gain 
valuable data to inform the ENERGY STAR® building certification standards and the 
Commercial Building Energy Consumption Survey. The real estate sector would be able to 
provide better information to clients as well, and energy performance could be better 
incorporated into property assessments. 
 
This policy option would address some of the information barriers that currently hinder energy 
efficiency in commercial buildings. Many building owners lack a fundamental understanding of 
the quantity and places where energy is actually being consumed. Benchmarking also prepares 
building owners and utilities for implementation of smart grid and demand response programs. 
There is also a noted lack of information about the location of buildings, another issue that this 
policy option would address. In addition, better energy management would result from giving 
benchmarking data to building owners. Lastly, this policy would lay the groundwork for future 
information, financial and regulatory policy options, such as mandated disclosure and on-bill 
financing.  
 
2.  Background 
 
2.1  Policy Experience 
 
Benchmarking creates an energy consumption baseline in a specific building.  If benchmarking 
is completed for a large set of buildings and stored in a shared database, a comparison of one 
building with the data of similar buildings is possible.  Benchmarking also helps to set priorities 
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for limited staff time and investment capital. EPA and the American Council for an Energy-
Efficient Economy (ACEEE) both suggest that savings up to 10% can be made at little or no 
cost to building owners, but these savings frequently go overlooked (Dunn, 2011; Nadel, 2011).   
 
The U.S. and Canada recently announced that they would collaborate on a common platform for 
benchmarking commercial building energy consumption (EPA, 2011).  The federal government 
also benchmarks its buildings as a result of Section 432 of the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007.  However, policy experience with benchmarking in the U.S. is largely tied 
to mandated disclosure policies at the state and local level (Figure 1).  Most of these policies 
emphasize the residential sector or are under consideration, but six cities and two states 
(California and Washington) have adopted mandated disclosure, which necessitates 
benchmarking as a prerequisite. Benchmarking requires an expenditure of time and effort, but in 
many cases the bulk of the effort is in gathering energy data, which this policy option could 
address. In fact, every one of the existing programs, including the international effort between 
the U.S. and Canada, uses Portfolio Manager as the benchmarking tool. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Mandated Disclosure and Benchmarking Efforts in the United States 
Source: www.IMT.org  
 
As of 2012, Portfolio Manager includes data on the current and past performance of more than 
300,000 buildings in the U.S., submitted by building owners or managers.  Many building types 
can be analyzed, including: banks/financial institutions; courthouses; data centers; dormitories; 
hospitals; hotels; houses of worship; K-12 schools; medical offices; office buildings; senior care; 
retail stores; supermarkets; warehouses; and wastewater treatment plants. For these building 




















































































qualify those buildings for ENERGY STAR certification, and help achieve Leadership in Energy 
and Environmental Design (LEED) certification. Other building types can be tracked by Portfolio 
Manager, but they cannot be scored out of 100 or qualified for an ENERGY STAR or LEED 
rating.  
 
The Institute for Market Transformation (IMT) summarized the recent experiences of nine 
current U.S. programs (Burr, Keicher, and Leipziger, 2011). As a result of program reviews and 
in-depth stakeholder discussions, a series of best practices were recommended for outreach 
and education, benchmarking, compliance, data quality, energy consumption data, and 
disclosure. For benchmarking, the main recommendation is to follow EPA guidelines 
surrounding the use of Portfolio Manager. This recommendation largely enables jurisdictions to 
avoid debates over building use and building type classifications, but there are other benefits as 
well, including easy integration of building data into the Portfolio Manager format. IMT also 
suggests that: 
 
 Compliance should be established from existing tax records  
 Data quality should be linked to a responsible party at the property via a signature 
 Utilities should receive support for any new incurred costs of compliance 
 The development of leases that include data access language should be encouraged. 
 
2.2 Results from Implementing Governments2 
 
While Europe has used mandated disclosure and benchmarking programs for many years, the 
U.S. is just beginning to implement these programs. Currently, the governments of New York 
City, Seattle, Washington, D.C., and Austin, Texas are taking leadership roles, with San 
Francisco and Chicago following close behind. Key program managers from each of the leading 
cities responded to questions during short telephone interviews. Even though individual contexts 
vary, there are a number of consistent findings across these programs that can be informative 
for policymakers.  
 
First, Portfolio Manager has found broad acceptance as the principal benchmarking tool. The 
time-series and cross-sectional comparison capabilities of the tool make it extremely attractive. 
The upcoming Portfolio Manager update and the Department of Energy (DOE) Building 
Technology Program Commercial Building Asset Rating tool are highly anticipated. The 
Sustainable Energy Efficiency Data Platform that DOE provides has also been well received 
because it helps the local governments share best practices and avoid replication. However, the 
multi-agency approach has led to confusion about federal roles, and some cities have 
suggested that clarifying leadership positions would be helpful.  
 
Second, all of the program managers believe a large information gap related to building energy 
consumption existed in their jurisdictions prior to the benchmarking and mandated disclosure 
                                                          
2
 Program managers from New York City, Seattle, Austin, Washington, D.C., and DOE’s Building 
Technology Program were interviewed. 
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laws. While benchmarking efforts have assisted in reducing this gap by informing building 
owners about total building performance, this effort has not eliminated the gap altogether; a 
number of stories detailed building owners who failed to understand the meaning of their 
building score.  
 
Third, tenant authorization is required for building owners to access energy consumption data in 
many jurisdictions. Working through the legal privacy issues is time consuming, and requires 
collaboration with utilities, local governments, the real estate market, and occasionally state 
governments. Rules and support for utilities to facilitate easy access and release of aggregated 
building data are particularly important as a legal issue. One manager stated that this is missing 
in his jurisdiction, and if he were starting over, aggregated building data would be the first thing 
they would emphasize.  
 
Fourth, every program experienced delays in implementation, largely due to aggressive rollout 
schedules and budgeting issues related to the economic downturn in 2008. Frequently, these 
ordinances and laws had to be amended after the program began in earnest. Lastly, a 
commonly noted issue was the lack of a qualified workforce. A government certification program 
that indicated the quality of various contractors who could improve a building’s energy 
performance was strongly requested. Benchmarking and mandated disclosure efforts have the 
potential to create and expand markets for energy contractors, and some means to differentiate 
between the contractors would reduce other information barriers for building owners.  
 












2.3 Policy Rationale 
 
“Policy actions…could, in principle, correct for the excessive present-mindedness of ordinary 
people” – Solow, 1991 
 
Benchmarking has the potential to reduce or eliminate information asymmetries in the 
marketplace and to reduce the discount rates used by consumers in the sector. A few scholars 
question the extent and evidence of such problems (Alcott and Greenstone, 2012; Gillingham, 
Newell, and Palmer, 2009; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994). However, this skepticism stems from the 
information assumptions of neoclassical economic theory. Policy tools based on such theory are 
Core Lessons From Program 
Managers 
 Portfolio Manager and the SEED 
database are great tools 
 Programs are reducing information 
gaps 
 Implementation is more difficult 
than anticipated 
 Building aggregation capacity is 
crucial 
  
Key Areas for Assistance  
 Clarifying leadership roles at the 
federal level 
 Workforce certification programs 
 Defining confidential data 
 Funding or rules for utilities to 
aggregate building data and 
facilitate release and access 
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unable to modify discount rates and provide no policy relevant advice for information-based 
gaps (Stern, 1986). In contrast, empirical research has found that information can modify 
discount rates in use; providing information may address a barrier to the deployment of energy-
efficient technologies that mainstream economic tools cannot. 
 
Theoretically, discount rates are determined by combining the market interest rate and, 
potentially, some level of uncertainty or risk; such a discount rate should be the same for all 
goods across time. Hausman (1979), in his study of air conditioner purchases, described the 
potential for ‘internal arbitrage’, where a consumer “trades” first costs for energy savings and 
benefits as a result. Hausman claimed that rational actors would equate the potential stream of 
energy savings from more efficient technologies with the monetary savings from buying less-
expensive equipment. His findings on observed discount rates, however, did not match the 
theory; consumers used discount rates that were much higher than the market. “Other factors 
such as uncertainty and the possibility of technological change do not seem sufficient to explain 
the high discount rate which we found.” (Hausman, 1979) Later research would find many 
instances where empirically observed discount rates deviated strongly from theory, finding that 
future gains receive higher discounting than future losses (Thaler, 1981), that smaller 
anticipated results (either positive or negative) receive higher discount rates than larger 
anticipated results (Benzion, Rapoport, and Yagil, 1989), and that consumers prefer improving 
sequences of outcomes (Frederick and Loewenstein, 2002; Varey and Kahneman, 1992). 
Furthermore, Sultan and Winer (1993) found no evidence of consumers using market-based 
discount rates across a number of appliances. 
 
Research specific to equipment purchasing decisions found numerous discount rates in use 
across the population. These discount rates vary over time and appliances (Train, 1985; 
Koomey, 1990). Frederick et al. (2002), in a review of the theoretical and empirical history of 
discount rates, found: 
 
The implicit discount rate was 17-20% for air conditioners (Hausman, 1979); 102% for 
gas water heaters, 138% for freezers, 243% for electric water heaters (Ruderman, 
Levine, and McMahon, 1987); and from 45% to 300% for refrigerators, depending on 
assumptions made about the cost of electricity (Gately, 1980). 
 
Disparate findings in discount rates across the population pose theoretical difficulties, but open 
the door for different policy approaches and rationales. A series of tools in regulatory, financial, 
and information areas may help to address discount rate issues: for example, standards can 
address high discount rates by eliminating low-efficiency choices, and subsidies and tax rebates 
can change the consumer discount rate calculation and result in better choices.  However, 
information-based policies have the unique ability to modify the discount rate in use. Studies 
have found that providing information can reduce discount rates anywhere from 3% to 22% 
(Coller and Williams, 1999; Goett, 1983). Coller and Williams suggest that information about 
energy consumption will result in a 5% decline in discount rates for energy decisions made by 
the median population. Depending on the discount rate in use, an adjustment of this size could 
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dramatically impact equipment decisions. Table 1 summarizes the findings of the literature by 
end use. 
 





Lighting 36% Koomey 1990, Metcalf 1995 




Lin, Hirst, and Cohn 1976; Goett 1978; Goett and McFadden 1982; 
Dubin 1982; Berkovec, Hausman, and Rust 1983; Goett 1983; Dubin 
and McFadden 1984 
Refrigerators 63% 
Gately 1980; McRae 1980; Cole and Fuller 1980; Meier and Whitier 




Goett and McFadden 1982; Dubin 1982; Berkovec, Hausman, and 
Rust 1983; Goett 1983 
Cooking 31% Lin, Hirst, and Cohn 1976; Goett 1983 
Ventilation -- N/A 
 
 
The discount rates empirically observed and discussed above are quite high. Solow (1991), in 
his famous presentation at Woods Hole, suggested that the market provided discount rates of 
5% or 6%, and those were higher than should be used by society to meet obligations to future 
generations. Pigou (1952) argued that government should be a trustee for the future, and as 
such, has a valid role in encouraging investment towards preservation. While benchmarking 
does not seem to have the ability on its own to reduce the social discount rates to a level 
envisioned by Solow, it shows the potential to move in that direction. 
 
This policy option would improve the functioning of the marketplace by providing information on 
commercial building energy performance and would make it easier to track building 
performance by connecting performance over time to the building’s BID number.  Numerous 
studies (Christmas, 2011; Campbell, 2011; Miller, Spivey, and Florance, 2008; Jackson, 2009; 
Das, Tidwell, and Ziobrowski, 2011, and others) show higher occupancy rates, higher rents, and 
higher property values for high-efficiency buildings. Benchmarking could increase the market 
demand for these buildings. Portfolio Manager itself has the potential to address many 
information gaps through its use of time-series data and cross-sectional comparisons. This may 
lead to more efficient technology choices, reduced uncertainty in maintenance costs, and lower 
fuel costs and ease the attainment of building certifications like ENERGY STAR.  The ties 
between Portfolio Manager and ENERGY STAR certification also reduce transaction costs for 
renters desiring high-performance space. This could reduce the size of the principal-agent 
problem by creating market and social pressure for building owners to consider energy in 




Benchmarking spurs energy-efficiency investments (NMR Group, Inc. and Optimal Energy, Inc., 
2012), one of the fastest and most direct means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions that is 
also cost-effective (Ciochetti and McGowan, 2010). The emission of greenhouse gases is 
causing climate change, the “greatest and widest-ranging market failure ever seen,” (Stern, 
2007). To the extent that benchmarking limits the emission of greenhouse gases, it helps to 
correct this negative externality and mitigates the threat posed by climate change. 
 
The Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration compiled a list of 
barriers to the deployment of technologies with the ability to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
(CCCSTI, 2009). As a policy option, benchmarking has the potential to address a number of 
these barriers: it provides better information about energy use and performance; it addresses 
general gaps in information, where neither building owners nor tenants are aware of building 
performance; it addresses information asymmetries, where either the owner or tenant is 
unaware of building performance, especially when coupled with mandated disclosure laws; and 
it reduces discount rates and the size of the principal-agent problem. This policy option has the 
potential to be a step towards better consumer choices without resorting to price signals or 
regulation. At the same time, its success depends on the cooperation of a diverse set of 
stakeholders. 
 
2.4 Policy Evaluation 
 
Appropriateness of the Federal Role 
 
Many have argued that it is an appropriate role of government to address the high discount 
rates observed among consumers. Policy actions utilizing high discount rates may be viewed as 
consuming today at the expense of future generations. While there is no agreement on the 
appropriate government discount rate, the Office of Management and Budget suggests using 
7% generally (OMB Circular A-4, 2003). Prominent economists, such as Solow and Weitzman 
have suggested values below a 6% average may be preferred; if consumers have a discount 
rate higher than 6%, then the government could correct through policies and procurement 
practices with lower discount rates to maintain a 6% average. Regardless of the exact 
percentage governments should use, it is clear that mainstream positions hold that government 
has a role in protecting the rights and opportunities of future generations, and part of this role 
involves managing the societal discount rate. Since information can affect the discount rate, 
overcoming barriers to information have the potential to reduce the discrepancy between the 
consumer and government rates. 
 
The federal government has historically taken a lead in overcoming information barriers in the 
market for building energy efficiency by providing national data on building characteristics, 
energy use and standardized benchmark metrics through the Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), ENERGY STAR, and other programs.  This policy could be an appropriate next step to 
improve the information available to building owners, lower transaction costs, and enable cost-
effective energy-efficient upgrades on a wide scale.  This policy would also allow for building 
performance to be tracked over time, with the understanding that all public data would be 
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reported without identifiers.  This feature would also ensure the integrity of different building 
labeling systems like ENERGY STAR and LEED. 
 
Benchmarking also provides a way to reduce the greenhouse gas emissions driving climate 
change that traditional economic tools cannot. In this way, it is a complementary policy tool to 
economically efficient approaches like carbon pricing policies, guiding behavioral changes by 
energy managers and users. With the commercial sector representing 19% of U.S. CO2 
emissions (over 3% of global emissions), and that percentage expected to grow (DOE, 2012), 
managing the emissions of the sector is critical to “preventing dangerous interference with the 




Private interests and state and local governments have typically pursued the energy 
benchmarking of commercial buildings. However, the federal government is also benchmarking 
its own sizeable building stock through the Federal Energy Management Program. Economy-
wide participation may enable broad understanding of building performance by building owners 
and lead to improved sectoral performance. Benchmarking for all commercial buildings exists 
only in three states; national requirements would have broad applicability without being 
duplicative. At the same time, a federal program would need to be able to coexist with pre-
established state and local benchmarking programs, and avoid preemption of more stringent 
state and local efforts.  
 
Significant Potential Benefits 
 
Benchmarking studies have shown the potential to reduce energy consumption through 
modifying discount rates by 3% to 22% (Coller and Williams, 1999; Goett, 1983). By decreasing 
discount rates, benchmarking is increasing the importance of the energy savings in consumer 
choices, improving the likelihood that consumers will purchase more efficient equipment, and 
use existing equipment more wisely. This in turn should allow consumers to capture a portion of 
the potential energy savings that are overlooked, estimated at up to 10% (Dunn, 2011; Nadel, 
2011). 
 
The first major analysis of mandated benchmarking in the United States was conducted by 
researchers at the University of Pennsylvania and New York University reported by New York 
City in August of 2012. While this assessment only covered the first year of reported data, it 
found that if low performing buildings could be brought up to the median energy use intensities 
for their class, the city would reduce energy consumption in large building by 18% and reduce 




The Portfolio Manager software framework already exists and an update is about to be 
released. More administrative resources would be needed to operate Portfolio Manager at the 
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anticipated increased rate of use and to add the BID number to the database. Utilities may need 
to develop new forms or reformat existing templates to prepare data for entry into Portfolio 




Benchmarking provides some benefits on its own, but it also enables other policies, like 
mandated disclosure, and reduces a gap in decision-making that few other policy approaches 
are able to assist with.  As such, it is a good candidate to provide policy synergies as part of a 
comprehensive policy package for the building sector. 
 
Timing of Results 
 
Benchmarking would spur the purchase of high efficiency equipment very rapidly, as has been 
shown. It appears that it may take time for the energy savings to offset the equipment 
investment, but the investment is cost-effective for the sector as a whole. Benchmarking has the 
potential for immediate changes in decision-making for the commercial sector, but may take 
time to yield positive social benefits, particularly if the emissions projections for the East North 
Central division are borne out. However, in the end, the policy option presents an opportunity for 
tens of billions in social benefits over the modeled period. 
 
3. Stakeholders and Constituencies 
 
Energy efficiency can work in a polarized world. This option enables widespread access to 
standardized benchmarking data on a building basis.  Benchmarking is a fundamental activity 
for energy management, and as such, enables many other efficiency efforts. Key stakeholders 
for this policy are expected to be building owners and operators, tenants, utilities, real estate 
agents, building contractors, various national-level associations (like the Building Owners and 
Managers Association (BOMA), the National Association of Realtors, the National Association of 
Energy Service Companies, etc.), state and local governments, and the federal government. 
 
Building owners will largely be the recipients of information that utilities collect and submit into 
Portfolio Manager on their behalf. Most building owners will be able to make use of the 
information through the Portfolio Manager interface, identify problem buildings, and take 
appropriate action. Portfolio Manager ratings will also simplify the process of legitimizing claims 
of building performance and improve the earnings potential for these building owners. Some 
small percentage, as revealed in the interviews with program managers, is likely to ignore or 
misunderstand the Portfolio Manager rating. In general though, building owners and operators 
are expected to oppose mandated benchmarking efforts. BOMA has launched its own 
benchmarking effort utilizing Portfolio Manager, called BOMA STARS, and currently has more 
than 690 million square feet covered by the program. However, one of the BOMA arguments for 
this program is to demonstrate that government mandates are unnecessary; thus, while BOMA 
supports benchmarking in general, it may believe that mandated benchmarking efforts are not 
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the proper role of the Federal government (BOMA, 2012). BOMA is not supportive of the DOE 
Asset Rating Tool being developed by DOE’s Building Technology Program.  
 
Building operators, managers, and real estate investment trusts, tasked with maximizing return 
and minimizing operating costs, are expected to be supportive of benchmarking efforts. The 
International Facilities Management Association’s Energy Challenge program operates similarly 
to BOMA STARS, but does not suggest any opposition to benchmarking efforts required by 
governments (IFMA, 2012). Discussions with stakeholders also suggest that this constituency 
regularly utilizes benchmarking in managing building portfolios and views benchmarking as a 
best practice. 
 
Tenants are another critical constituency of this policy option. Depending on the language used 
to create the obligation by utilities to report energy consumption data, tenant privacy rights may 
need to be addressed. Current efforts underway across the nation have required different 
means of coding data so a specific tenant’s energy consumption could not be determined; in 
some jurisdictions, the interpretation of legal language by utilities has stopped the release of 
data for certain buildings. Explicit language detailing the privacy rights of tenants and the 
reporting requirements by utilities is necessary for successful national implementation of this 
policy option. Tenants may reserve support for the policy option if privacy concerns are not 
addressed. However, if building owners begin promoting their buildings based on their Portfolio 
Manager ratings, or at least make these results public, tenants benefit from increased 
information and the ability to identify buildings where utility costs will be lower. In total, tenants 
are expected to be supportive of this policy option, but that is dependent on the ability of the 
approach to successfully protect their privacy. 
 
Many utilities already provide data for Portfolio Manager or can do so with relatively minor 
adjustments, but others may face a higher burden.  Support may be found for utilities that are 
able to leverage the benchmarking information towards their demand response programs, which 
have been found to be increasingly cost-effective, particularly in regions with wholesale markets 
that can pay attractive rates for shedding electric loads (Pande et al., 2010; Spees and Lave, 
2007). Demand response and energy efficiency are at the top of the loading order of electric 
resources in California (Faruqui and Mitarotonda, 2011). Experience with existing programs has 
shown mixed support for benchmarking, with uncertainty surrounding legal privacy obligations 
the largest concern. If such questions were clearly answered, utilities would have clear guidance 
on acceptable ways of reporting energy consumption data. It may also be the case that utilities 
will experience greater costs in establishing such reporting and building aggregation programs: 
ConEdison in New York City charges building owners $102.50 to aggregate consumption to the 
building level, for example (Burr et al., 2011). This cost was determined by ConEdison and 
approved by the New York State Public Service Commission. 
 
Utilities in states with decoupling may be more supportive of this policy option. Traditionally, 
utilities recover fixed costs from consumption charges. When sales fall, utilities may not recover 
all their fixed costs; thus, in states that are not yet decoupled, benchmarking may cause a loss 
of utility revenues. When sales increase, utilities may collect more than their authorized fixed 
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costs and reasonable return. This creates an incentive for “throughput” and a disincentive for 
energy efficiency programs. One option for regulators is to eliminate the throughput incentive by 
implementing decoupling mechanisms through rate structures. Of the five cities that have 
implemented benchmarking programs, all but one (Austin) are located in states where 
decoupling is either adopted or pending. Utilities deploy benchmarking efforts to identify existing 
opportunities; developing measurement and verification protocols for utilities to claim credit for 
some of the energy savings from benchmarking efforts would likely increase support for this 
policy option. 
 
Building contractors and construction firms are a stakeholder who may be indirectly impacted, 
depending on the success of a national benchmarking program in transforming the marketplace 
for commercial building retrofits and new construction. To the extent that this policy option 
generates more jobs and projects for this sector, they may be supportive. Groups like the 
National Association of Energy Service Companies (NAESCO) have supported mandatory 
benchmarking and mandated disclosure laws in the past (NAESCO, 2011).  However, if 
benchmarking becomes viewed as a move towards a national building code by the broader 
community of contractors, these stakeholders may become more suspicious, and consequently, 
less supportive. The key national advocacy organizations for this stakeholder say relatively little 
about benchmarking and related policy options, aside from general support for energy efficiency 
(Associated Builders and Contractors, 2008, for example). 
 
Other national associations that emphasize energy and environmental policy have taken 
positions on benchmarking efforts. The National Resource Defense Council’s Center for Market 
Innovation supports energy benchmarking language in lease agreements as a way to partially 
address principal-agent problems and information asymmetries in the commercial sector 
(Center for Market Innovation, 2011). The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 
has also recommended benchmarking as a way to begin transforming the efficiency 
marketplace and shift towards more performance-based assessments (Mackres and Hayes, 
2012). 
 
The real estate industry largely favors subsidization as a way to make progress toward energy-
efficiency goals, and does not support mandates. For example, the NAIOP (a large commercial 
real estate development association) suggests raising the existing tax credits from $1.80/ft2 to 
$3.00/ft2, as a way to increase commercial building efficiency. As an empirical matter, financial 
incentives seem to be ineffective at driving green-building designations, including ENERGY 
STAR, unlike regulatory approaches (Choi, 2010). NAIOP opposes national-level building 
codes, which are viewed as insensitive to local contexts, and generally, energy-efficiency 
requirements for buildings (NAIOP, 2012). While this position does not explicitly eliminate 
support for this policy option, it seems that the general outlook of the real estate industry would 
be negative. Since better energy performance increases the value of properties and 
benchmarking has been shown to improve energy performance, it appears that the economic 
interest of the industry may initially favor this type of benchmarking. However, if buildings began 
to seriously promote their energy scores, the buildings with lower scores may lose market 
 
15 
share. Since ENEGY STAR limits its certifications to the top 25% (roughly), the economic 
interests of the industry may then switch and opposition may be the dominant position. 
 
Lastly, state and local governments are stakeholders. States like Washington, Massachusetts, 
and California have already taken action for commercial buildings (Burr et al., 2011), and many 
other states have required benchmarking for government buildings (such as Michigan and Ohio) 
(Buonicore, 2010). Local governments across the country have also involved themselves 
directly in benchmarking efforts, almost entirely through mandated disclosure laws, as 
discussed earlier in this paper. Such efforts have greatly increased Energy Service Companies 
(ESCO) projects (Burr, 2012). Increased property values may also lead to increased property 
tax revenues. None of these state and local approaches has attempted this particular policy 
option, however. In general, governments may find this policy option amenable because it would 
likely make compliance with a mandated disclosure law much easier to achieve, perhaps 
lowering resistance from other stakeholders and addressing information issues.     
 
Table 2 summarizes this stakeholder analysis of mandated benchmarking as a policy option, 
highlighting the numerous favorable views but also acknowledging the presence of mixed 





Table 2: Stakeholder Assessment of Benchmarking 
Stakeholder Pros Cons Dominant Position 
Building Owners 
Could reduce energy 
costs, increase rent 
receipts, and increase 
number of tenants 
Mandatory compliance 
requires coordination 
and effort with utilities 
Mixed 
Building Managers and 
REITs 
Reduced energy costs 
and improved building 
value 




Better information about 
buildings would enable 
selection of better 
performing floorspace 
Data privacy concerns Favorable 
Utilities 
May lessen demand, 
especially at peak 




Required reporting of 
energy data imposes a 
new cost; in states 
without decoupling, 

















values for those 
buildings that achieve 
certification 
May negatively impact 






“green” images can 
reduce energy 
consumption and 
emissions, move the 
market, and reduce 
information barriers 
Managing the 
compliance effort can 






Our analysis of the potential of benchmarking in the commercial sector utilizes the Georgia Tech 
version (GT-NEMS) of the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2011 National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS). GT-NEMS uses a combination of discount rates and the rate for U.S. 
government ten-year Treasury notes to calculate consumer hurdle rates used in making 
equipment-purchasing decisions. While the macroeconomic module of GT-NEMS determines 
the rate for ten-year Treasury notes endogenously, the discount rates are inputs to the model. 
Modifying these inputs is the primary means of estimating the impact of benchmarking for the 
commercial sector in this analysis. This is done in two steps: first, by updating the discount rates 
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to reflect a broader selection of the literature; and second, by adjusting the updated discount 
rates to account for the effects of a national benchmarking policy. 
 
The GT-NEMS inputs for discount rates are separated by end use, including space heating, 
space cooling, ventilation, lighting, water heating, cooking, and refrigeration, and broken into 
seven population segments for each end use. Each population segment is capable of using a 
different discount rate with regard to the end use in question each year. In the Annual Energy 
Outlook 2011 (EIA, 2011a) Reference case, these discount rates are quite high; for example, 
more than half of the consumer choices made surrounding lighting and space heating use 
discount rates greater than 100% and less than 3% of the population uses discount rates under 
15% (EIA, 2011b).  
 
While it is well known that consumers utilize high discount rates as discussed earlier, such high 
discount rates are not reflected by the bulk of the existing research. An extensive literature 
review spanning four decades uncovered more than two-dozen studies estimating implicit 
discount rates for commercial consumers across the GT-NEMS series of appliances. The mean 
discount rates in this literature ranged from 17% (space heating and space cooling both) to 63% 
(refrigerators). The Simulation and Econometrics To Analyze Risk (SIMETAR) tool was used to 
develop continuous probability distribution functions for each end use. GRKS distributions were 
used for space cooling, lighting, cooking, and water heating. SIMETAR matched Weibull 
distributions as a better fit for space heating and refrigeration, so these two do not use a GRKS 
distribution. Ventilation was the sole end use to have no specific studies, so the space heating 
distribution was used to represent it (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Probability Distribution Functions by End Use 
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Discount Rate 
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The probability density functions were then divided into seven segments containing an equal 
area under the curve for each end use. The median value of each of these seven segments was 
used as an input into GT-NEMS in the Updated Discount Rates scenario (UDR). To estimate 
the impact of benchmarking, it was assumed that the findings of Coller and Williams (1999) 
would hold, and that the median discount rate would decline by five percentage points. 
Therefore, for the true median of each end use, the discount rate was lowered by five 
percentage points. The quotient of this “benchmarked” median discount rate and the updated 
median discount rate was calculated and used as an adjustment factor to the other six 
population segment medians. In this way, the findings of Coller and Williams are carried 
throughout the consumer population, since each population segment reduces by the same 
proportion as the median.  
 
If these benchmarked discount rates were all GT-NEMS utilized in determining the hurdle rates 
of consumers, this method should estimate the impact of benchmarking, given the Coller and 
William (1999) findings. However, GT-NEMS adds the rate of ten-year Treasury notes to these 
values, which vary by year according to macroeconomic conditions. The model results of the 
Reference case Treasury note rates were compared to the same in the updated discount rates 
scenario described above. The difference in Treasury note rates was insignificant. This finding 
enabled the Reference case Treasury note rates to be subtracted from the updated discount 
rates so that final hurdle rate calculated by GT-NEMS matches the values suggested by the 
literature. These modifications generate the main policy case (referred to as “Benchmarking”). 
All policy scenarios begin in 2015. Table 3 presents the 2015 hurdle rates used in GT-NEMS 
across scenarios for two major end-uses in the commercial sector, space heating and lighting 
(these values represent the sum of the Treasury bill rates and the discount rates). 
 
Table 3: Discount Rates Across Scenarios for Space Heating and Lighting in 2015 
% of Population Discount Rate* 
Reference UDR Benchmarking Reference UDR Benchmarking 
Space Heating 
27 14.2 14.2 1005.75 56.7 40.4 
23 14.3 14.3 105.75 27.5 19.6 
19 14.3 14.3 50.75 21.6 15.4 
18.6 14.3 14.3 30.75 17.4 12.4 
10.7 14.3 14.3 20.75 13.8 9.8 
1.5 14.3 14.3 12.25 10.4 7.4 
0.2 14.3 14.3 5.75 6.7 4.8 
Lighting 
27 14.2 14.2 1005.75 66 57.3 
23 14.3 14.3 105.75 47 40.8 
18.6 14.3 14.3 50.75 42 36.5 
18.6 14.3 14.3 30.75 38 33 
8.8 14.3 14.3 20.75 35 30.4 
1.5 14.3 14.3 12.25 31 26.9 
2.5 14.3 14.3 5.75 25 21.7 





Lastly, a sensitivity is estimated, where benchmarking is modeled as transformative and brings 
new, highly efficient technologies to the marketplace. This sensitivity (referred to as 
“Benchmarking +”) utilizes the EIA High Tech technology suite for the commercial sector and 
represents a scenario in which benchmarking efforts result in the development of new, more 
efficient technology to meet market demands. This sensitivity is consistent with the 
“announcement effect” that has been documented in financial and product markets where the 




5.1 Impacts on Commercial Energy Consumption 
 
The impact of all of these scenarios on energy consumption can be seen in Figure 3. The 
Update Discount Rate shows savings of 2.75% in 2020 and 5.1% in 2035; Benchmarking is 
responsible additional savings of 0.25% in 2020 and 0.5% in 2035. 
 
 
Figure 3. Commercial Sector Energy Consumption 
 
Benchmarking reduces energy consumption without reducing the commercial sector’s growing 
spatial footprint. As a result, energy intensity, measured in Btu per ft2, declines, as does the 
nation’s energy intensity as a whole (Figure 4). In 2020, Benchmarking results in a 3% 
improvement in energy intensity, relative to the Reference case. While significant, this 
improvement is 17% short of the Better Buildings Initiative goal of a 20% improvement over 
2020 energy intensities in the commercial building sector. Thus, a benchmarking policy is 
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Figure 4. Change in Energy Intensity from Reference 
 
Table 4 presents a cost-benefit analysis of the benchmarking policy option from the private 
sector perspective, including energy savings and new investment costs. Benchmarking shows 
the potential to save 600 TBtus in 2020, increasing to 1,330 TBtus by 2035, representing 
approximately 3% and 5.6% of commercial energy consumption, respectively. In total, the 
commercial sector would see savings of over 30,000 TBtus over the lifetime of the equipment 
chosen in the Benchmarking scenario. Equipment expenditures decline in total, with a present 
value $30 billion, and result in savings of more than $95 billion (2009-$), when evaluated with a 
7% discount rate. From the perspective of the private sector as a whole, benchmarking offers 
large benefits. As noted earlier, even with such benefits, certain interests may not find such 
results compelling. 
 
Relative to the UDR case, Benchmarking induces an additional savings of 40 TBtus in 2020 and 
110 TBtus in 2035. Benchmarking shows the potential to save 2,800 TBtus beyond the UDR 



















































































































Top numbers represent Benchmarking compared to the Reference case. Numbers in parentheses are Benchmarking 
compared to the UDR case. 
*Annual values are shown with no discounting to reflect the magnitude of savings in each given year 
**Cumulative values are net present values discounted at 7%. Investments stimulated from the policy occur through 
2035. Energy savings degrade at an annual rate of 5%, such that all policy effects have ended by 2055. 
***Percent of annual commercial energy consumption. 
 
Reductions in investment costs may seem counterintuitive, because reducing the discount rate 
should encourage investment in more efficient technologies, which are typically more 
expensive. All investment costs were directly calculable except ventilation; to estimate 
ventilation costs, the average $/MMBtu saved for space cooling was calculated annually from 
the GT-NEMS projection, and applied to the reduction in ventilation energy consumption to 
serve as a proxy. In most end-uses studied, the investment costs do increase, to the tune of 
several hundred million dollars a year. However, such increases in investment costs are offset 
by the reductions coming from one technology class – lighting. 
 
More advanced lighting technologies are frequently higher quality, with longer lifetimes. This 
results in lower operations and management (O&M) costs. An advantage of using GT-NEMS is 
the ability to learn what technologies are being selected, down to a Census division and building 
type resolution (a more complete discussion of building types and regions is in the following 
section). When comparing Benchmarking and the Reference case, two technologies are 
primarily responsible for the reduction in investment – F32T8 Super fixtures and CFLs. F32T8 
Supers are displacing F32T8 High Efficiency standard fixtures. The HE fixtures, while having 
lower initial costs, are slightly more expensive to maintain and lower efficiency than the Supers. 
Healthcare, offices (both large and small) and mercantile buildings are the biggest F32T8 Super 
adopters by building type, and particularly those in the South Atlantic, Mid Atlantic, and Pacific 
Census divisions. CFLs are pulling service demand away from LED and PAR-38 bulbs; CFLs 
have slightly higher first costs than PAR-38s, but lower O&M costs and much-improved energy 
performance. CFLs also have lower O&M costs than LEDs in the GT-NEMS technology profile. 
As a result, two-thirds of the increase in CFL service demand comes from PAR-38s and one-
third from LEDs. These changes are taking place nationally in lodging, mercantile, and large 
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office buildings, mostly in the South Atlantic, East North Central, and West South Central 
Census divisions. 
 
The F32T8 Supers become more dominant when Benchmarking is compared to the UDR case, 
as the operating costs become more important in the decisions made by consumers. Adoption 
increases significantly in healthcare, large and small office, and mercantile buildings in the 
South Atlantic, Mid Atlantic, and East North Central Census divisions. However, CFLs lose 
service demand to LEDs after 2020. While CFLs have significantly lower first costs and slightly 
lower O&M costs than LEDs, the ascendant LED is 2.1x more efficient than the CFL, and has 
an expected lifetime that is ten years longer. The improved lifetime and performance of LEDs 
leads to increased rates of adoption when comparing Benchmarking and the UDR case. 
 
5.2 Variations across Building Types and Regions 
 
The potential benefits are not uniformly distributed; there are significant variations across the 
building types in the sector. Benchmarking seems to offer savings that are sustained over time, 
but have a bigger impact early in the modeled period. The energy savings range from 1% (Small 
Office) to 6% (Assembly) in 2020, averaging 3% across all building types. By 2035, the range is 
2% (Small Office) to 11% (Assembly), averaging 5% across all building types relative to the 
Reference case (Figure 5). These numbers show that the relative divergence from the 
Reference case occurs most rapidly in the first five years; it takes the next 15 years to achieve 
roughly the same percentage gain. This finding is generally true for all building types. Mercantile 
buildings are responsible for the largest reduction in energy consumption from any single 
building type, saving 60 TBtus in 2020 and 133 TBtus in 2035. However, mercantile buildings 
are relatively average performers; the energy savings for these buildings are larger because 
mercantile buildings represent roughly 25% of commercial building energy consumption. 
Savings for particular building types may be slightly overestimated for large office and 
warehouse building types, where managers and real estate investment trusts frequently 





Figure 5. Delivered Energy Consumption by Building Type 
 
The potential benefits also vary geographically by region over time, comparing the Reference 
case and the Benchmarking scenario (Figure 6). In 2020, the energy savings as a result of the 
benchmarking policy range from an increase of 1.9% in the East North Central division to 5.6% 
savings in the Mid Atlantic division when compared to the Reference case. CO2 emissions in 
2020 range from an increase of 5.8%, again in the East North Central division, to a reduction of 
5.8% in the South Atlantic division. Electricity rates decrease most in the New England division 
with lagging energy savings, perhaps as a result of the rebound effect and price elasticities. 
 
By 2021 all of the divisions would reduce their energy consumption as the result of 
benchmarking; by 2035, the energy savings range from 4.7% in the West South Central region 
to 6.9% in the Mountain region. CO2 emissions reductions in 2035 range from from 4.2% in the 
West South Central region to 6.3% in New England. Over the entire time frame, the South 
Atlantic achieves the highest average reductions in consumption and CO2 emissions, opposed 
to the East North Central, which, while still averaging reductions, trails in both categories. On 
electricity prices, New England receives the highest average reduction in price at 2.5%, while 
East South Central sees the least impact, averaging no change from the Reference case. 
 
The effect of the UDR case is pronounced, although the regional ‘cast’ is much the same. East 
North Central increases energy consumption by 3.6% and Mid Atlantic decreases consumption 
by 2.6% (to reiterate a previous point, national energy consumption in 2020 is 0.2% lower in 


































increase of 6.4% in East North Central to a decrease of 2.9% in West North Central. Electricity 
rates decline in 8 of 9 Census divisions, led by New England at 3.3%. 
 
Looking further into the projection, East North Central begins to show energy reductions after 
2022, similar to the comparison with the Reference case. However, New England and East 
South Central show a net increase in energy consumption from 2022 through 2035. In 2035, 
energy consumption ranges from an increase of 0.5% in East South Central to a decrease of 
1.9% in the Mid Atlantic. Not surprisingly then, the impact on CO2 emissions also diverges from 
the comparison of Benchmarking to the Reference case, with 2035 results ranging from an 
increase of 1.04% in West North Central to a decrease of 1.1% in the Pacific. Electricity prices 
in this comparison range from an increase of 0.9% in the Mid Atlantic to a decrease of 1.7% in 
New England in 2035. While the national trend is to decline in all three of these metrics 
(electricity price, energy consumption, and CO2 emissions) relative to the UDR case, the 
regional results are not unidirectional, nor do they scale proportionally from the Reference case.   
 
Figure 6 highlights that the effect of benchmarking in the East North Central Division is complex 
and unique. Demand for electricity would be reduced as a direct impact of the policy. As a 
result, coal and electricity prices would decline almost 3%. Many regions see similar reductions 
in the price of electricity, but the East North Central division derives the vast majority of its 
electricity from coal – consuming more coal than any other division in the nation. The response 
of this division to the national downward pressure in prices is to increase consumption. In 2020, 
coal supplies 40 billion kWh more than in the Reference case. While the East North Central 
division is the only division in the country to increase demand for coal in the electric power 
sector in 2020 (seven others reduce their demand, and one sees no difference) relative to the 
Reference case, its increase is large enough that national coal demand exceeds that of the 
Reference case in 2020. As a result of these interactions, carbon intensity, energy consumption, 
and a variety of emissions all increase in 2020 for the East North Central division; no other 
census division experiences these effects. Coal consumption is consistently higher than in the 
Reference case through 2035 for this division.  
 
However, the commercial sector for this region experiences another series of dramatic changes 
after 2020. GT-NEMS introduces a set of newly available technologies in 2020, many of which 
see increased levels of adoption compared to the Reference case (i.e., air-source heat pumps). 
As old equipment is retired, much higher efficiency equipment replaces it. The price of electricity 
also increases relative to the 2010’s. Thus, while East North Central experiences electricity 
prices that averaged 2.4% lower than the Reference case between 2015 and 2020, prices are 
only 0.13% lower than the Reference case between 2025 and 2030. This level of savings is 
below the national average for these out years. Energy consumption would also fall during this 
later period, due to strong and consistent reductions in natural gas consumption. The end result 







Figure 6. Change from the Reference Case in Commercial Energy Consumption, Carbon 






In general, these projections show that CO2 reductions are and remain closely tied to energy 
savings. This indicates that while benchmarking has the potential to reduce energy 
consumption, it will not motivate major changes in energy production – either from centralized 
sources or from major increases in the deployment of renewables within the commercial sector. 
With few exceptions, carbon intensity marginally increases; this is due to decreases in natural 
gas consumption for electricity generation in all regions of the country. Coal consumption for 
electricity generation, while generally declining, decreases less than natural gas, and slightly 
increases in three census divisions (East North Central, East South Central, and West South 
Central). Commercial buildings tend to be operating at highest capacity during regular business 
hours, so the gains in efficiency from benchmarking reduce the need for natural gas peakers 
while having little impact on baseload power production like coal. Such findings have 
implications for multiple stakeholders, particularly utilities with demand response programs. 
 
5.2 Technology Readiness 
 
Benchmarking, as a policy option, emphasizes better decision-making. In the analysis 
performed here, the available technologies are the same as the Reference case of the EIA 
Annual Energy Outlook 2011 (EIA, 2011a). As a result, the savings described in this scenario 
are the result of deploying currently available technologies and technologies anticipated to 
become available with no changes from the current policy landscape. Table 5 shows the change 
in energy consumption by end-use for the two major fuels used in the sector (natural gas and 
electricity). In both 2020 and 2035, the greatest savings are from ventilation, followed by natural 
gas space heating and electric space cooling. Electric space heating experiences an increase in 
consumption after 2029, following a shift towards more heat pumps in those years. Excluding 


















































































































































Top numbers represent Benchmarking compared to the Reference case. Numbers in parentheses are Benchmarking 
compared to the UDR case.  
 
Benchmarking results in a series of technology shifts across the major end uses, summarized in 
Table 6. Low efficiency boilers, furnaces, and water heaters see ongoing reductions in service 
demand. In every technology class, the shift is consistently towards more efficient equipment. 
To be clear, Table 6 shows technologies gaining and losing the most service demand in the 
comparison between scenarios and as such, does not reflect the level of service demand met 
by these technologies. A dominant, well-deployed technology that experienced no change in 
service demand would not appear in the analysis represented by Table 6 because there was not 




Table 6. Technology Shifts: Benchmarking versus Reference Case 
End Use 2010-2020 2020-2035 
Electric Space Heating 
 Ascendent 
Technologies 
Typical air source heat pump 
(COP 3.3) 
Typical air source heat pumps (COP 3.3) 
 Declining 
Technologies 
Typical electric boiler (COP 
0.94); *Packaged space heat 
(COP 0.93) 
Typical electric boiler (COP 0.94); 
*Packaged space heat (COP 0.93) 
Natural Gas Space Heating 
 Ascendent 
Technologies 
High efficiency furnaces (88%) 
and boilers (95%) 
High efficiency gas boilers (95%) 
 Declining 
Technologies 
2007 Standard furnace (78%); 
*2007 High efficiency furnace 
(80%) 




High efficiency reciprocating 
chillers (COP 3.5) 




Low efficiency reciprocating 
chillers (COP 2.3) 
Low efficiency centrifugal chillers (COP 
4.7) 
Electric Water Heating 
 Ascendent 
Technologies 
Solar water heaters (COP 2.5) Typical heat pump water heater (COP 2.3); 
*Solar water heaters 
 Declining 
Technologies 
2007 Standard electric water 
heater (COP 0.97) 
2007 Standard electric water heater (COP 
0.97) 
Natural Gas Water Heating 
 Ascendent 
Technologies 
High efficiency gas water 
heater (COP 0.93) 




2007 Standard gas water 
heater (COP 0.78) 






26W CFL; F32T8 Supers 
#
26W CFL; *Typical LED; F32T8 Supers 
 Declining 
Technologies 
F32T8 HE – standard; PAR-38 F32T8 HE – standard; PAR-38 
Unless noted, comparisons to the Reference and UDR selected the same technologies.  
*Technology selected in the UDR comparison but not the Reference comparison. 
#
Technology selected in the Reference comparison but not in the UDR comparison. 
 
For space heating, Benchmarking projected a fuel shift from natural gas to electric technologies. 
In 2020, the move is from typical natural gas furnaces to high efficiency natural gas furnaces. 
However, in 2035, a 135 TBtu drop in service demand for a typical natural gas furnace is met by 
a 143 TBtu increase in service demand for an air-source heat pump, representing a change in 
the fuels and technologies selected by consumers to meet demand. In total, there is a 105 TBtu 
increase in service demand for electric space heating and a 98 TBtu decline in service demand 




In comparing Benchmarking to the UDR case, the story is largely the same. While there is quite 
a bit of service demand shifting within each fuel type, there is a net loss of 4 TBtu in service 
demand for natural gas space heating, and a net gain of 4 TBtu in electric space heating. By 
2035, this service demand trading increases to 18 TBtus, demonstrating a small shift towards 
electric heat pumps. 
 
5.3 Cost Effectiveness 
 
The Benchmarking projections reduce energy demand, as has been shown earlier in this paper. 
Natural gas consumption is down an average of 3.5%, and 4.2% for electricity compared to the 
Reference case. The result is a reduction in price for both natural gas and electricity of 0.83% 
and 0.85%, respectively. When the Benchmarking projections are compared to the UDR case, 
natural gas and electricity consumption decline an average of 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively, with 
a corresponding 0.2% and 0.3% average reduction in price for each fuel. This reduction helps to 




Figure 7. Effect of Benchmarking on Energy Prices 
 
Decreased demand compounded by declining energy prices would result in a reduction in 
energy expenditures by the owners of commercial buildings. Compared with the Reference 
case, 2020 expenditures would decline by 3%, a savings of $7 billion; in 2035, expenditures 
would decline 6.5% with savings worth $15 billion (Figure 8). On average, annual energy 
expenditures decline by 5% and are valued at $9.5 billion. These savings represent $115 billion 
through 2035, and $146 billion over the lifetime of the installed equipment, that can be put to 
productive use elsewhere in the economy (evaluated with a 7% discount rate). Compared with 
the UDR case, 2020 expenditures decline by 0.8%, worth $1.5 billion; 2035 expenditures 
decline 0.9% and are worth $1.9 billion. Average expenditures decline by 0.6%, valued at $1.1 
billion. Savings through 2035 have a net present value of $10.7 billion, increasing to $13.1 













































Figure 8. Commercial Sector Energy Expenditures 
 
The national GDP impacts of the benchmarking policy modeled in this policy are minor. GT-
NEMS projects that national GDP will reach $19.1 trillion (2009-$) by 2020 in the reference 
case. Benchmarking is projected to increase national GDP by $5 billion, equivalent to an 
additional 2.3 hours of productivity. In 2035, the national GDP is projected to hit $28.2 trillion 
(2009-$) in the reference case; the benchmarking projection of GDP is exactly the same in 
2035. 
 
Aside from the benefits that would pass to the private sector from reduced energy expenditures, 
there are additional social benefits from fewer emissions of pollutants. These are broken into 
criteria pollutant (SO2, NOx, and PM2.5 and PM10) benefits and CO2 benefits. Changing the 
regulatory framework for these pollutants and other changes (lower prices or new discoveries, 
for example) that result in dramatic departures from projected ways of meeting energy demand 
would lead to different estimates of the costs and benefits associated with these pollutants. 
 
Criteria pollutant benefits are calculated based on values from the National Research Council 
(2010), and take into account public health effects, damages to crops and timber, buildings, and 
recreation. Such damages tend to vary substantially depending on meteorological conditions, 
proximity of populations to emitters, and sources and means of electricity generation (Fann and 
Wesson, 2011). The National Research Council estimates exclude damages from mercury 
pollution, climate change, ecosystem impacts, and other areas where damages are difficult to 
monetize. Even with this incompleteness, damages from coal power plants are estimated to 
exceed $62 billion annually, and new analysis of this sort suggests that the damages from coal 
power plants exceeds the value-added to the economy (Muller, Mendelsohn, and Nordhaus, 
2011). The average values provided for electricity generation and on-site use of energy sources 
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Carbon dioxide emissions are outputs of GT-NEMS and are the result of fuels used for energy 
on-site and in the electricity sector. Thus, they are dynamic and change annually based on the 
mix of fuels used to meet commercial sector energy demand. The economic value of reductions 
in CO2 is estimated by multiplying the annual decrement in emissions by the “social cost of 
carbon” (SCC). The SCC is an estimate of the marginal damage caused by a ton of CO2. In this 
analysis, the central values of the U.S. Government Interagency Working Group on the Social 
Cost of Carbon (EPA, 2010) are used, ranging from $25 per metric ton of CO2 in 2015 to $47 
per metric ton of CO2 in 2050 (in 2009-$). 
 
When compared to the Reference case, the net value of avoided emissions is estimated at $470 
million in 2020, improving to $5.45 billion in 2035. In 2020, criteria pollutant increases would be 
responsible for $360 million in damages due to regional changes in the electricity generation 
profile, but CO2 reductions would add benefits of $830 million. By 2035, criteria pollutants and 
CO2 would provide social benefits valued at $1.14 billion and $4.31 billion, respectively. 
Cumulatively, the net present value of these emissions reductions would be $21.7 billion 
through 2035 and $35.8 billion in 2055 when evaluated with a 3% discount rate, the bulk of 
which are derived from reductions in CO2 emissions (Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9: Emissions Benefits of Benchmarking 
 
When compared to the UDR case, Benchmarking results in $60 million in net benefits in 2020, 
with $190 million in benefits from criteria pollutant reductions countering an increase in CO2 
emissions that represent damages of $130 million. In 2035, these roles have reversed; criteria 
pollutant emissions are higher than in the UDR case, representing $450 million in damages, 
while CO2 emissions are slightly lower, worth an estimated $130 million. Cumulatively, the net 
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2055 (using a 3% discount rate). This reduction in cumulative net benefit is the result of an 
increase in coal consumption during the last five years of the modeled period and its long-
lasting effect on the projection to 2055. 
 
While the benchmarking policy option is modeled as ceasing in 2035, the benefits of the policy 
would extend into the future due to the lifetime of energy-saving technologies installed as a 
result of the policy. Energy-efficient technologies have varying lifetimes, both less and more 
than 20 years (for example, natural gas water heaters do not last 20 years, but chillers and 
boilers last longer).3 This analysis, consistent with the literature, assumes that energy savings 
degrade at 5% annually (Brown et al., 1996). Therefore, technologies installed in 2035 provide 
the greatest savings in that year, with a linear decline in savings out to 2055, when energy 
savings are no longer expected. The same rationale is applied to emissions benefits. 
 
Buildings with multiple tenants will require aggregation services in order to determine the energy 
footprint of an entire building. The additional cost incurred by this service is referred to in this 
analysis as the compliance costs. These costs were determined using the 2003 Commercial 
Building Energy Consumption Survey (CBECS) data (EIA, 2007), which provides the number of 
multi-tenant buildings with electric and natural gas service. The average square footage of a 
multi-tenant building from CBECS is used in conjunction with GT-NEMS projections of 
commercial floorspace to produce estimates of the number of multi-tenant buildings that will 
exist between 2004 and 2035. Burr (2012) estimates that existing mandated disclosure laws will 
require 60,000 buildings to undergo benchmarking regardless of this policy option, so these 
buildings are subtracted from the total. It is assumed that the cost of compliance will be the 
same for each building, following the ConEdison model in New York City, and is set at $102.50 
(2011-$) for electricity and natural gas, such that a building needing aggregation for both fuels 
would incur costs of $205. The end-result is an initial cost of $141 million (2009-$) in 2015. 
Costs for new buildings after 2015 are also included, and range from $2.7 million in 2016 to $3.2 
million in 2035 (2009-$).  
 
These costs are modeled as public costs due to concerns about the distributional impacts and 
policy viability. If these costs were directed to utilities, opposition to the policy would likely grow 
substantially. The costs of accounting upgrades and software development are probably minor, 
but the cost of benchmarking every building would not be. Even though some cities have 
adopted a utility-pays model (Seattle and Austin), it is not recommended for national 
implementation efforts. If costs were directed toward building owners, building owners would be 
incentivized to avoid complying with the policy. As the purpose of the policy is to identify and 
benchmark the energy consumption of as many buildings as possible in the U.S., this approach 
is not complementary to the goals of the policy. Given these potential effects of policy 
implementation choices, it is recommended that the federal government finance compliance. 
Such an approach would alleviate increased utility opposition and foster a cooperative 
environment. The federal government’s initial expenditure on the program would be 
considerable, but one-time at that magnitude; additional year’s costs would be roughly 2% that 
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of the first. Other policy designs may include some form of cost-sharing between the public and 
private sectors, or phased-in benchmarking requirements based on the square footage of (i.e., 
buildings over 50,000 ft2 the first year, 40,000 ft2 the second year, etc.), as has been seen in 
local jurisdictions. 
 
Having tallied the benefits and costs of benchmarking to both the private and public sector, it is 
worthwhile to see how these compare from the perspective of society. Table 7 shows all of this 
information. In the first five years of the policy, compliance costs and the increases in criteria 
pollutant emissions are significant costs, but the commercial sector is showing net benefits of 
$6.1 billion compared to the Reference case. By 2035, cumulative energy savings, combined 
with the benefits of reduced emissions, exceed cumulative equipment and compliance costs by 
more than $100 billion. By 2055, all new equipment has been retired and net benefits have 
grown to $175 billion. This yields a social benefit/cost ratio of 4.6 using a 3% discount rate. The 
result of comparing Benchmarking to the UDR case presents smaller net benefits but a higher 
benefit/cost ratio, as can also be seen Table 7. 
 
Expanding the view to the national level adds in energy savings and expenditures for the nation, 
as well as the effects on pollutant emissions and the equipment investment costs of the 
residential sector. The value of energy savings show large increases here, largely as a spillover 
effect of lower energy prices following the changes in demand from the commercial sector. 
Changes in the electricity generation profile increase pollutant emissions early in the modeled 
period. The persistence of negative emissions benefits varies, depending on whether the 
Reference case or the UDR case is used as a baseline for comparison. The consistency of 
higher pollutants as a result of the Benchmarking approach suggests that complementary 
policies will be necessary to ensure that there is no backslide in public health and welfare, such 
as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard rule recently released by the EPA. Using a 3% discount 
rate, net social benefits increase to $260 billion with a benefit/cost ratio of 6.4 when compared 
to the Reference case. Using the UDR case as the baseline increases the benefit/cost ratio to 





Table 7. Commercial Sector Social Benefit/Cost Analysis of Benchmarking* 
 



































































































































































































































































*Present value of costs and benefits were analyzed using a 3% discount rate. Numbers in parentheses are 
Benchmarking compared to the UDR case. 
**The total impact accounts for the energy savings and its related benefits occurred throughout the lifetime the 
commercial equipment, assuming an average lifetime of 20 years.  
 
As is always the case with a benefit/cost analysis, there are important costs and benefits that 
were unable to be characterized, so it is crucial to recognize this effort as a best guess (Krutilla, 
1967). For example, the costs of utilities in developing new aggregation software packages and 
adjusting accounting methods so data can be easily input into Portfolio Manager have not been 
successfully estimated here. Also, the benefits of improved asset values for building owners and 
local governments, as well as numerous unpriced environmental benefits, are lacking from this 
analysis. Many benefits of having a data set that included all commercial buildings would be 
present for researchers and could improve policy decisions at the federal level, but these 
benefits are also lacking from this analysis. Lastly, a major benefit of benchmarking is the 
reduced transaction costs necessary to learn about building energy performance. Reducing 
these transaction costs are likely to be a large part of the policy rationale behind pursuing a 
policy like benchmarking, but methods to estimate the value of reduced transaction costs are 







Many improvements in commercial building energy efficiency could be spurred by requiring 
utilities to submit building energy data to a uniform database accessible to building owners and 
tenants. Numerous other advantages would also present themselves as a result of the proposed 
BID system. 
 
If the marketplace shifted as a result of benchmarking and other related policy efforts, the 
market may see an opportunity for good energy performance, spurring an end-user-driven 
marketplace shift and further increasing the information available to the marketplace. Building 
owners would have motivation to seek highly energy-efficient tenants, perhaps presenting such 
tenants additional incentives and inducements. Private organizations or government could grant 
recognition of quality energy management to specific tenants, further reducing transaction costs 
between tenants and building owners. This could enable market-based rewards for good energy 
management by tenants, representing something similar to an ENERGY STAR program for 
tenants that allowed them to signal their quality. 
 
It is estimated that the benefits of a national benchmarking policy outweigh the costs, both to the 
private sector and society broadly. Overcoming some of the information barriers in the sector 
looks to be a worthy investment, mostly on the basis of the potential for energy savings. 
Opposition to benchmarking is likely to be grounded in concerns over tenant privacy, incurred 
costs (depending on policy design), and fear of the impact on the value of poor-performing 
buildings. Clarity from the federal government in policy design could substantially reduce some 




Alcott, H., and M. Greenstone. (2012). “Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap?” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 26(1), 3-28. 
 
Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc. (2008). ABC Urges Senate to Open Training for 




Benzion, U., A. Rapoport, J. Yagil. 1989. “Discount rates inferred from decisions: an 
experimental study.” Management Science 35(3): 270-284. 
 
Brown, M.A., A. Wolfe, R. Bordner, A. Goett, V. Kreitler, and R. Moe. 1996.  “Persistence of 
DSM Impacts: Methods, Applications, and Selected Findings.”  EPRI TR-106193.  Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory and Synergic Resources Corporation for the Department of Energy and 




Building Owners and Managers Association, International (BOMA). 2012. BOMA STARS. 
http://www.boma.org/getinvolved/BOMASTARS/Pages/default.aspx  
 
Buonicore, A. 2010. The Formidable Challenge of Building Energy Performance Benchmarking. 
Buonicore Partners. http://www.bepinfo.com/images/PDF/BEPNwhitepaper-AB-3-30-10.pdf 
 
Burr, A.C. 2012. Benchmarking and Disclosure: State and Local Policy Design Guide and 
Sample Policy Language. State and Local Energy Efficiency Action Network. 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/seeaction/pdfs/commercialbuildings_benchmarking_policy.pdf 
 
Burr, A.C., C. Keicher, and D. Leipziger. 2011. BUILDING ENERGY TRANSPARENCY: A 




Campbell, Iain A. 2011. “Tapping Into a Trillion Dollar Industry: How to Increase Energy 
Efficiency Financing by 2015.” The 5th Annual Energy Efficiency Finance Forum. ACEEE. 
http://www.aceee.org/files/pdf/conferences/eeff/2011/2011presentations.pdf  
 
Carbonell, Tomas, Shelley Fidler, and Douglas Smith, 2010.  “Using Executive Authority to 
Achieve Greener Buildings: A Guide for Policymakers to Enhance Sustainability and Efficiency 
in Multifamily Housing and Commercial Buildings.”  
http://www.vnf.com/assets/attachments/USGBC%20report%204-29-10.pdf 
 
Center for Market Innovation. 2011. Energy Efficiency Lease Guidance. NRDC. 
www.nrdc.org/greenbusiness/cmi/files/CMI-FS-Energy.pdf 
 
Choi, E. 2010. “Green on Buildings: The Effects of Municipal Policy on Green Building 
Designations in America’s Central Cities.” The Journal of Sustainable Real Estate, 2(1), 1-22. 
 
Christmas, John. 2011. “Financing Energy Efficiency in the Commercial Building Sector: Is 
There Hope Post-PACE?” The 5th Annual Energy Efficiency Finance Forum. ACEEE 
http://www.aceee.org/files/pdf/conferences/eeff/2011/2011presentations.pdf  
 
Ciochetti, B. and M. McGowan. 2010. “Energy Efficiency Improvements: Do They Pay?” The 
Journal of Sustainable Real Estate 2(1), 305-333. 
 
Coller, M. and M. Williams. 1999. “Eliciting Individual Discount Rates.” Experimental Economics 
127, 107-127. 
 
Committee on Climate Change Science and Technology Integration (CCCSTI). 2009. 
“Strategies for the Commercialization and Deployment of Greenhouse Gas Intensity-Reducing 




Das, P., A. Tidwell, and A. Ziobrowski. 2011. “Dynamics of Green Rentals over Market Cycles: 
Evidence from Commercial Office Properties in San Francisco and Washington DC.” The 
Journal of Sustainable Real Estate, 3(1): 1-22. 
 
Department of Energy (DOE). 2012. Buildings Energy Data Book. 
http://buildingsdatabook.eren.doe.gov/ 
 
Dunn, C. (Speaker). 2011. Benchmarking in Portfolio Manager for State and Local Governments 




Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2007. Commercial Building Energy Consumption 
Survey. http://www.eia.gov/consumption/commercial/  
 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2011a. Annual Energy Outlook 2011. DOE/EIA-
0383(2011). http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2011).pdf  
 
Energy Information Administration (EIA). 2011b. Commercial Demand Module of the National 
Energy Modeling System: Model Documentation 2011. 
http://www.eia.gov/FTPROOT/modeldoc/m066(2011).pdf  
 
Fann, N., and K. Wesson. 2011. “Estimating PM2.5 and Ozone-Related Health Impacts at the 
Urban Scale.” http://www.epa.gov/airquality/benmap/docs/ISEE_BenMAP.pdf 
 
Faruqui, Ahmad and Doug Mitarotonda, “Energy Efficiency and Demand Response in 2020: A 
Survey of Expert Opinion,” The Brattle Group, November 2011, 
http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload990.pdf  
 
Frederick, S. and G. Loewenstein. 2002. “The psychology of sequence preferences.” Working 
paper, Sloan School, MIT, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Frederick, S., G. Loewenstein, and T. O’Donoghue. 2002. “Time Discounting and Preference : A 
Critical Time Review.” Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2): 351-401. JSTOR. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2698382  
 
Gately, D. 1980. “Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using 
Durables: Comment.” Bell Journal of Economics 11, 373-374. 
 
Gillingham, K., R. Newell, and K. Palmer. 2009. “Energy Efficiency Economics and Policy.” 
Resources for the Future. http://rff.org/rff/documents/RFF-DP-09-13.pdf  
 
Goett, A. 1983. Household Appliance Choice: Revision of REEPS Behavioral Models. Final 




Granade, Hannah Choi, Jon Creyts, Anton Derkach, Philip Farese, Scott Nyquist, and Ken 




Hausman, J. 1979. “Individual discount rates and the purchase and utilization of energy-using 
durables.” The Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1): 33-54. 
 
Hirst, Eric and Marilyn Brown. 1990. “Closing the Efficiency Gap: Barriers to the Efficient Use of 
Energy.” Resources, Conservation and Recycling 3(4): 267-281. 
 
International Facilities Management Association (IFMA). 2012. “IFMA Energy Challenge: 
ENERGY STAR FAQs.” http://www.ifma.org/resources/sustainability/challenge-faq.htm 
 
Jackson, J. 2009. “How Risky Are Sustainable Real Estate Projects? An Evaluation of LEED 
and ENERGY STAR Development Options.” The Journal of Sustainable Real Estate, 1(1): 91-
106.  
 
Jaffe, A. and R. Stavins. 1994. “The Energy Paradox and the Diffusion of Conservation 
Technology.” Resource and Energy Economics 16(2). 
 
Krutilla, J. 1967. “Conservation Reconsidered.” The American Economic Review, 57(4), 777-
786. 
 
Koomey, J. 1990. “Energy efficiency in new office buildings: an investigation of market failures 
and corrective policies.” PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, CA. 
 
Mackres, E. and S. Hayes. 2012. “Keeping It in the Community: Sustainable Funding for Local 
Energy Efficiency Initiatives.” Report Number E124. Washington, D.C.: American Council for an 
Energy-Efficient Economy. 
 
Miller, N., J. Spivey, and A. Florance. 2008. “Does Green Pay Off?” Working Paper. University 
of San Diego, San Diego, California. 
 
Muller, N., R. Mendelsohn, and W. Nordhaus. 2011. “Environmental Accounting for Pollution in 
the United States Economy.” American Economic Review, 101(August), 1649-1675. 
 
Nadel, Steven. 2011. Buildings Energy Efficiency Policy: A Brief History. Presentation made at 









National Association of Energy Service Companies (NAESCO). 2011. “State of New Jersey 
Energy Master Plan: Comments of the National Association of Energy Service Companies on 
the 2011 Draft Energy Master Plan.”  http://www.naesco.org/policy/testimony/2011-08-25.pdf 
 
National Research Council (NRC). 2010. Hidden Costs of Energy: Unpriced Consequences of 
Energy Production and Use. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
 
NMR Group, Inc., with Optimal Energy, Inc. 2012. “Statewide Benchmarking Process Evaluation 




Office of Management and Budget (OMB). (2003). Circular A-4. 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory_matters_pdf/a-4.pdf 
 
Pande, A., R. Schmidt, D. Mahone, E. DeBellevue, and P. Turnbull. 2010. “Breaking Market 
Barriers to Major Demand Side Management Investments in a Large Financial Institution,” in 
proceedings of 2010 ACEEE Summer Study on Energy Efficiency in Buildings, Pacific Grove, 
CA, August 15-20, 2010. 
 
PlaNYC. 2012. New York City Local Law 84 Benchmarking Report. New York City. 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/gbee/downloads/pdf/nyc_ll84_benchmarking_report_2012.pdf  
 
Pigou, A.C. 1952. The Economics of Welfare. 4th ed, London: MacMillan and Co, Ltd. 
 
Prindle, Bill. 2007. Quantifying the Effects of Market Failures in the End-Use of Energy. Paris,  
France: International Energy Agency. 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.aceee.org/ContentPages/4790329.pdf 
 
Ruderman, H., M.D. Levine, and J.E. McMahon. 1987. “The Behavior of the Market for Energy 
Efficiency in Residential Appliances Including Heating and Cooling Equipment.” Energy Journal 
8(1): 101-124. 
 
Solow, R. 1991. Sustainability: An Economist’s Perspective. Presented as the Eighteenth J. 
Seward Johnson Lecture at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Woods Hole, MA. 
 
Spees, K. and L.B. Lave. 2007. “Demand Response and Electricity Market Efficiency.” The 





Stern, N. 2007. Stern Review: “The Economics of Climate Change.” Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Stern, P. C. (1986). “Blind Spots in Policy Analysis: What economics doesn’t say about energy 
use.” Policy Analysis, 5(2): 200-227. 
 
Sultan, F. and R. Winer. 1993. “Time preferences for products and attributes and the adoption 
of technology-driven consumer durable innovations.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 14(4): 
587-613. 
 
Thaler, R. 1981. “Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency.” Economics Letters, 8(3): 
201-207. 
 
Train, Kenneth. 1985. “Discount Rates in Consumers’ Energy-Related Decisions: A Review of 
the Literature.” Energy, I(12): 1243-1253. 
 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 1992. 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf 
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2010. “Technical Support Document: Social Cost 
of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866.”  
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-tsd.pdf   
 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 2011. The Governments of United States and 




Varey, C. and D. Kahneman. 1992. “Experiences extended across time: evaluation of moments 
and episodes.” Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 5(3): 169-185. 
 
Weitzman, M. L. 2007. A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 22, 703-724. 
